CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 119

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radical change in the political situation in this area that it might be both politically acceptable and indeed, desirable, that we should withdraw before 1975-76. It might well prove to be the case that this date was the

earliest practicable date for an orderly total withdrawal, bearing in mind

both the consequences for our forces and those for the economy of Singapore.

But we should not commit ourselves to a date which would preclude us from

such earlier withdrawal if our circumstances later made this practicable.

Our withdrawal should be decided in the light of events rather than by an

arbitrary date fixed for the purpose of military planning. The date of 1975-76 should therefore be envisaged as the last date by which we would be

prepared to stay in Singapore and Malaysia.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that there was

general agreement in the Committee with the broad proposals put forward by

our combat

the Defence Secretary, namely that we should seek to reduce a

Malaysia ore/t

forces and employment of local civilians in Singapore by the order of a half by 1970-71 and aim to withdraw wholly from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76,

while not precluding the possibility of earlier withdrawal if political

events made this feasible. The Committee also took the view at this stage

that we should have a minimum military presence in Australia, though their

view would be without prejudice to the possibility of the Government

deciding in June or July, after the initial series of consultations with our

allies, that we should withdraw wholly from this area, while still honouring

our obligation to assist Australia and New Zealand in the event of their

being attacked. There should now be a full interdepartmental examination

by officials of the implications of these proposals. This examination

should elicit the extent to which they would involve changes in our Treaty obligations and in military commitments made under them, should examine the political and economic consequences of these reductions in so far as this was possible in the absence of consultations on the spot and should make recommendations about the manner in which the proposals should be put to our

allies. This study should be circulated to the Committee in time for them

to reach decisions before the meeting of the SEATO Council on 20th-21st April. It would also be necessary to give further consideration to the Ministers who should represent the United Kingdom at that Meeting for discussion of the proposals. Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary should consider urgently what the Defence Secretary might say to the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, during their discussions early in April. It would be necessary to bear in mind the

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